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ABSTRACT 
In order to test the moderating role of corporate strategy and 
industry environment in the effect of liquidity on investment 
for Portuguese manufacturing firms, we developed a multiple 
linear regression model for panel data. It is a static model with 
three types of variables: financial; strategic/environmental; 
and interactive. The estimated model was validated through 
the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg and Wald Modified tests 
(heteroscedasticity tests), Lagrange Multiplier (industry 
random effects test, using the two-digit National Classification 
of Economic Activities), Hausman robust test (fixed effects 
model vs. random effects model test) and likelihood-ratio test 
(joint effect of industry and time test). The statistical 
processing of the data revealed that a company’s strategy 
(diversification and innovation) and the industry environment 
(growth) moderate the effect of liquidity on investment, which 
can be explained by the effect of these factors on the cost of 
asymmetric information.  
Key words: liquidity, investment, leverage, industry 
environment, corporate strategy. 
RESUMO 
Com o objetivo de testar o papel moderador da estratégia e do 
ambiente da indústria na relação da liquidez com o investimento 
da indústria transformadora portuguesa foi desenvolvido um 
modelo de regressão linear múltipla para dados em painel. Trata-
se de um modelo estático com três tipos de variáveis: financeiras; 
estratégicas/ambientais; e interactivas. O modelo estimado foi 
validado através dos testes de Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg e 
Wald Modificado (testes de heterocedasticidade) do multiplicador 
de Lagrange (teste aos efeitos aleatórios da indústria, tendo-se 
utilizado a Classificação Portuguesa das Atividades Económicas a 
dois dígitos), teste robusto de Hausman (teste do modelo de 
efeitos fixos vs. o modelo de efeitos aleatórios) e teste likelihood 
ratio (teste ao efeito conjunto da indústria e do tempo). O 
tratamento estatístico dos dados revelou que a estratégia da 
empresa (diversificação e inovação) e o ambiente da indústria 
(crescimento) influenciam a intensidade da relação da liquidez 
com o investimento o que pode dever-se ao facto destes fatores 
influenciarem os custos de informação assimétrica das empresas. 
Palavras-chave: liquidez, investimento, endividamento, 
ambiente da indústria, estratégia empresarial. 
  
 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this study is to test the moderator role of corporate 
strategy and industry environment in the relationship 
between internal liquidity (cash flows) and investment in the 
manufacturing industry. The strategies and environmental 
dimensions analyzed are innovation, diversification, growth 
and dynamism. 
Following the work of Fazzari et al. (1988), the sign and the 
intensity of the relationship between cash flows and 
investment has been justified by several authors with the 
existence of restrictions on external financing resulting from 
capital market imperfections. 
The literature on capital structure has revealed the factors, 
often of a financial nature, that explain asymmetric 
information costs. However, asymmetric information costs 
and, consequently, corporate financial options can also be 
associated with strategic and environmental factors, which led 
Bettis (1983) to highlight the importance of financial theory 
and strategic management integration. 
1. Literature review 
Fazzari et al. (1988) started a period of great development in 
the study of the effect of liquidity on corporate investment, 
through the presentation of research in which the investment 
model is subject to financial restrictions. In this study, and in 
the studies that followed, the levels of corporate financial 
constraints were evaluated through the intensity of the 
relationship between net value and cash flows with 
investment. This relationship is explained in financial theory 
by the fact that financial constraints are associated with 
asymmetric information costs, including agency and adverse 
selection costs. 
Dividend payout ratio (e.g. Fazzari et al., 1988; Alti, 2003), size 
(e.g. Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Carpenter and Guariglia, 
2008), banking relationships (e.g. Hoshi et al., 1991; Houston 
and James, 2001: Riddiough and Wu, 2009), debt level (e.g. 
Whited, 1992; Gérard and Verschueren, 2003), bonds rating 
(e.g. Whited, 1992; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Agca and 
Mozumdar, 2008) and interest coverage ratio (e.g. Whited, 
1992) constitute some of the proxies used in the assessment of 
financial constraints. Other authors (e.g. Kaplan and Zingales, 
1997; Hovakimian and Titman, 2006) have used a set of 
variables to classify a firm’s financial position. However, 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997, 2000) warn of the difficulties in applying this 
methodology which arise from the diversity of financial 
constraints to which firms are subject, and from the fact that 
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 the proxy for investment opportunities may not be effective, 
leading to the internal liquidity proxy also constitutes a proxy 
of investment opportunities. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain the agency costs arising 
from conflicts of interest between creditors and 
managers/entrepreneurs by invoking the argument of moral 
hazard. The conflict is associated with the fact that managers 
may engage in activities which are undesirable from the 
standpoint of creditors, reducing the likelihood of debt 
repayment. High debt levels can induce managers to choose 
projects with high risk and to replace assets since managers’ 
compensation varies positively with project risk. However, the 
increased risk of projects leads investors to raise interest rates 
and to introduce clauses in loans which restrict future 
indebtedness. In a context of asymmetric information between 
managers and financiers, heavily indebted firms prefer 
financing with internal funds, not only because the cost of 
external funds is greater than the internal costs, but also 
because it is difficult for the firm to obtain additional funds in 
the market and to renegotiate existing loan agreements so as 
to prevent failure and bankruptcy. In the event that there are 
insufficient internal funds, these companies may be faced with 
a problem of underinvestment. When its financial position is 
unfavorable, there is an even greater need for a firm to have 
recourse to external funds that, in this context, have a high 
cost, which translates into a low and inefficient investment 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1990). 
The other component of agency costs is called free cash flow 
cost, and it results in excess flows of funds after the funding 
for all projects with positive net present value (Jensen, 1986). 
It occurs when the incentives of managers and shareholders 
are not aligned, and may lead to a reduction of the 
shareholders’ wealth and to overinvestment if there are any 
excess funds (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). In this situation, 
managers, seeking to obtain personal benefit at the expense of 
shareholders, carry out superfluous expenditure and invest in 
projects with a reduced recovery period but with high risk, 
which contributes to an increase in control and monitoring 
costs (Jensen, 1986). Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) argue 
that managers have incentives to make the company grow 
above its optimal size, because growth increases their power 
due to the increase in the resources under their control. 
The adverse selection arises from the existence of capital 
market asymmetric information, which makes it difficult to 
distinguish between firms on the grounds of their quality, and 
leads, as a moral hazard, to investors demanding higher 
returns to compensate them for the additional risk and 
monitoring costs. However, asymmetric information leading to 
adverse selection occurs prior to the transaction, while moral 
hazard occurs after the conclusion of the transaction. This 
generates a differential between the cost of financing in the 
capital markets (debt and new shares) and internally 
generated funds. This sometimes leads to the implementation 
of lower quality projects, while others, more economically 
advantageous, are not carried out because they fail to attract 
the required funds. A rise in market interest rates can cause 
only those companies with a higher risk to be willing to 
borrow at that rate, because those companies feel that the 
likelihood of debt repayment is low (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
On the other hand, the literature suggests that strategic and 
environmental variables can also affect the relationship 
between internal funds and investment, although the study of 
this theme needs to be deepened. Strategy (e.g. innovation and 
diversification) can influence asymmetric information and 
transaction costs and, consequently, corporate financing 
(Jordan et al., 1998; Menéndez-Alonso, 2003). It is also 
expected that the industry environment affects the 
relationship between investment and internally generated 
funds because it affects the risk of bankruptcy and firms’ 
capacity for debt (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990). 
The strategy of innovation in products and/or processes has 
high asymmetric information costs (leading to moral hazard 
and adverse selection), so it tends to be pursued by firms that 
have a good financial position (reduced indebtedness and high 
liquidity) (Brophy and Shulman, 1993; Jordan et al., 1998; 
O’Brien, 2003; Singh and Faircloth, 2005). This is the only way 
they can ensure the continuous investment in research and 
development (R&D), the availability of funds for the launch of 
new products or the introduction of new processes, and the 
expansion of their knowledge base through the acquisition of 
other companies. The market has great difficulty in predicting 
the output from the inputs in an innovative firm, which does 
not allow an easy distinction between “good” projects and 
“bad” projects, and this exacerbates the problems of moral 
hazard and adverse selection (Himmelberg and Petersen, 
1994) and reduces the firm’s ability to raise capital in the 
market. 
Research in the area of strategy and finance concludes that 
unrelated diversification generates inefficiencies because 
decisions taken within the organization do not follow the same 
principles according to which decisions are taken on the 
market. Sometimes resources are channeled into businesses 
with poor performance, and there is a kind of “socialism” with 
the strongest divisions subsidizing the weaker (Scharfstein 
and Stein, 2000). The investment in the different segments of a 
company depends less on their investment opportunities than 
would be the case if the segment constituted a firm (Lamont, 
1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998). Distortions in the allocation of 
resources are more accentuated when inequality between the 
resources and investment opportunities of the divisions is 
very large (Rajan et al., 2000). The overinvestment of firms in 
a strategy of unrelated diversification is explained by agency 
theory, which says that a manager prefers  to channel free 
cash flows into new activities rather than to distribute them, 
so that his power is not reduced (Lim et al., 2009). On the 
other hand, the managers of such companies avoid debt 
because of the controlling effect that debt brings to their 
activity (Stulz, 1990). The literature that has sought to relate 
performance to strategy suggests that companies with 
concentrated activities have superior performance, providing 
them with greater financial capability (Lang and Stulz, 1994; 
Lamont and Polk, 2002). 
Financial theories suggest that firms which operate in growth 
sectors generally have a lower risk of bankruptcy and a higher 
debt capacity (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990). Pecking 
order theory proposes a positive relationship between growth 
and debt, since internal funds may not be sufficient to fund a 
firm’s investment plan. On the other hand, adverse selection 
problems tend to be less acute when investment opportunities 
are high, since the issuance of debt is seen by the market as a 
positive step to ease the indebtedness. At the level of 
organizational performance, studies indicate that industry 
growth can be associated with more investment to take 
advantage of investment opportunities and maintain a 
competitive position (Lippit et al., 1988; Bobillo et al., 2002), 
making the investment depend mainly on the availability of 
external funds. 
Regarding the effect of environmental dynamism in business 
finance, different studies suggest that borrowing happens 
more often in stable environments than in highly dynamic 
environments because the probability of a positive effect of 
the environment on performance is higher in the first 
situation. The choice of a lower level of debt by companies 
who develop their activity in unstable environments can be 
justified by agency and transaction costs theories. Agency 
theory suggests that higher risk leads, in some cases, to 
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 investors’ refusal to finance projects and, in other cases, to the 
interest rate increasing and the manager’s activity being 
restricted due to the control exercised by debt holders 
(Simerly and Li, 2000). According to Milliken (1987), 
environmental dynamism affects the amount and quality of 
information for decision-making. In a highly dynamic 
environment, markets and stakeholders have difficulty in 
assessing corporate investments and manager’s decisions. 
Thus, companies that operate in relatively stable 
environments should prefer to finance through debt, because 
the cost of debt tends to be lower than in more unstable 
environments, and debt holders can enjoy the competitive 
movements of the company and can control the agency 
problems (Simerly and Li, 2000). As environmental dynamism 
increases, debt will be replaced by equity (Simerly and Li, 
2000). Transaction costs theory recommends equity financing 
in situations of high specialization (Williamson, 1988). 
Companies that operate in dynamic environments require 
more specialized equipment and personnel and more 
investment in R&D and marketing than firms in stable 
environments so that, generally, they have a higher debt cost 
(Simerly and Li, 2000). 
2. Methodology 
3.1 Research hypotheses 
After the literature review, we formulated four research 
hypotheses with which we seek to determine whether the 
dependency of investment in respect of internal funds is 
moderated by strategic and environmental factors: 
1. Innovation strategy reinforces the effect of internal 
liquidity in assets investment, ceteris paribus. 
2. Diversification strategy reinforces the effect of 
internal liquidity in assets investment, ceteris paribus. 
3. Industry growth reduces the effect of internal liquidity 
in assets investment, ceteris paribus. 
4. Industry dynamism reinforces the effect of internal 
liquidity in assets investment, ceteris paribus. 
It is expected that investment in firms that pursue a strategy 
of innovation is more dependent on the availability of internal 
funds than is investment in other firms, due to the fact that 
this strategy is associated with higher asymmetric information 
costs. It is expected that investment in firms implementing 
unrelated diversification strategies is more dependent on 
internal funds than is investment in firms that prefer a 
concentration of activities (specialization), due to the 
overinvestment agency costs of these companies. Asset 
investment by companies whose industry offers high 
investment opportunities should depend less on internally 
generated funds than asset investment by companies that are 
similar but belong to industries that offer fewer investment 
opportunities. Whereas industry dynamism has a positive 
effect on business financing through equity, and retained 
earnings is the main source of financing for Portuguese firms, 
investment in firms belonging to industries with greater 
dynamism should depend more on internally generated funds 
than investment in firms that are similar but belong to 
industries with less dynamism. 
3.2 Data and variables 
The sample, obtained from the SABI database (System for 
Analysis of Iberian Balances) of the 20,000 largest companies 
in Portugal, is non-probabilistic and is composed of accounting 
and non-accounting data of manufacturing companies (codes 
15 to 37 of the Portuguese classification of economic activities 
– NACE), in the period 1998-2005. This sample is of 
unbalanced data, in order to obtain a panel which is as 
representative as possible. 
Approximately 2,200 manufacturing firms were excluded, 
throughout the period, because they had just started up, had a 
very difficult economic and/or financial situation, had capital 
shares owned by public authorities, experienced changes to 
the dummies Ownership Structure and Diversification and in 
three-digit NACE code, or did not have information that would 
allow the construction of the different variables of the model 
for at least one year of the period. Thus, a panel composed of 
2,320 firms and 11,204 observations was obtained. 
In accordance with the problem and the research hypotheses 
we defined the dependent variable (assets investment) and 
the explanatory variables. The latter variables were classified 
as liquidity (flow and stock of liquidity), investment 
opportunities (sales, profitability variation and inventory), 
control (collateral value, size, ownership structure and time 
effect), strategic (innovation and diversification), 
environmental (growth and dynamism of industry) and 
interactive (joint effect of liquidity, strategy and the industry 
environment). 
Table 1: Variablesa) 
Dependent Variables 
Assets Investment (ASSINV): 
1ti,
1-ti,it
1it
ASS
CASH)-ASS(-CASH)-ASS(
Y

  
Independent Variables 
Liquidity flow (CF): 
11  i,titit ASSCFX  
Liquidity stock (CASH): 
112  i,ti,t-it ASSCASHX  
Sales (SAL): 
13  i,titit ASSSALX  
Profitability variation (EBITVAR): 
  114  i,ti,t-itit ASSEBITEBITX  
Inventory (INVENT): 
1ti,1-ti,5it ASSINVENTX   
 
Collateral value (COLL): 
116  t,it,iit ASSFIXASSX  
Size (SIZE): 
17  i,tit LnSALX  
Ownership structure (OWNER): 
D1i = dummy variable 
Time effect (YEAR):  
D2t; D3t; D4t; D5t; D6t; D7t; D8t = dummy variables 
Innovation (INNO): 
D9i = dummy variable 
Diversification (DIVER): 
D10i = dummy variable 
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Industry growth (INDGROW): 
  118  i,titit INDSALINDSALX  
Industry dynamism (INDDYN): 
i(INDSAL)i INDSALSEX 9  
Joint effect of liquidity and innovation (CF×INNO): 
INNOCFDX iit 91  
Joint effect of liquidity and diversification 
(CF×DIVER): 
DIVERCFDX iit 101  
Joint effect of liquidity and industry growth (CF×INDGROW): 
INDGROWCFXX itit 81  
Joint effect of liquidity and industry dynamism 
(CF×INDDYN): INDDYNCFXX iit 91  
a) Abbreviations:  
 ASS – Total Assets, net; CASH – Cash and Equivalents; CF – Cash Flow; DIVER – Diversification Strategy; EBIT – Earnings Before Interest 
and Taxes; FIXASS – Fixed Assets, net; INDDYN – Industry Dynamism; INDGROW – Industry Growth; INDSAL – Industry Sales; INOV – Innovation 
Strategy; INVENT – Inventories; ASSINV – Assets Investment; Ln – Natural Logarithm; SAL – Firm Sales; SE – Standard Error of the regression 
slope coefficient (regression of industry sales against time over 8 years (1998-2005). 
 
The proxy of investment, assets investment, was preferred to 
the proxy fixed asset investment, which is more usual in this 
type of study, because it allows the analysis to consider all of 
the applications of funds by a firm (in fixed and current 
assets). Carpenter and Petersen (2002) follow the same 
procedure. Since most of the firms in the sample are not 
publicly owned, investment opportunities are measured 
through proxies that are not based on the market value of the 
firms but that have already been used in other studies. Sales 
was used as a variable, for example, by Hoshi et al. (1991), Van 
Ees and Garretsen (1994) and Mills et al. (1995), profitability 
variation was used by Kim and Sorensen (1986), and 
inventory by Carpenter et al. (1994). 
The control variable of ownership structure has a qualitative 
nature (1 – managers hold 50% or more of the capital stock; 0 
– managers hold less than 50% of the capital stock) due to 
database limitations. The database does not have a history of 
firms’ shareholders, since one was required to install an 
annual update to get the list of partners/shareholders and 
managers in different years. Since the capital participation of 
partners/shareholders and managers has great temporal 
variability, and the available information about the owners of 
the capital in each year does not always refer to the same 
period of the year, it was decided to construct a more stable 
artificial variable (dummy) representing only two states. 
The value for innovation strategy is based on the proportion of 
spending on R&D relative to sales (Expenditure on 
R&D/Sales), as used by Francis and Smith (1995) and O’Brien 
(2003). It was considered that a company pursues an 
innovation strategy in a period when the average of annual 
spending on R&D is equal to or greater than 1% of sales. The 
choice of diversification or concentration strategy is based on 
the marketed products, which is similar to the method 
adopted by Berger and Ofek (1995) and Servaes (1996). It is 
considered that a diversified company is one that is classified 
by more than two double-digit NACE codes. 
In order to control the effects of ownership structure, strategy, 
and environment in corporate investment and financing, due to 
limitations of the database and/or due to the definitions of the 
variables, some model variables do not vary over time 
(ownership structure, innovation, diversification and industry 
dynamism). 
3.3 Criteria for Sample Split 
The data are split according to the firm’s financial position 
during the period under review (1998-2005). This method, 
also used by Fazzari et al. (1988), aims to circumvent the 
endogeneity problems of the financial position proxy and the 
selection bias effect (attrition bias) that could result from the 
classification of the firm’s financial position every year. For the 
classification of the firm’s financial position, we used two 
indicators of the firm’s ability to obtain funding in the market 
that complement each other, equity to permanent financing 
ratio (equity/permanent financing ) and total debt ratio (total 
debt/total assets). The importance of debt level in the 
relationship between cash flow and indebtedness is 
highlighted by Whited (1992) and Cantor (1990) who state 
that the intensity of the relationship depends on the debt level 
of the firm. Depending on the value of the previous indicators, 
firms are classified into two groups, high financing capacity 
(HFC) and reduced financing capacity (RFC). 
The choice of the equity to permanent financing ratio for the 
classification of the firm’s financial position is for three reasons. 
First, long-term bank loans are the main source of external 
financing for investment in fixed assets for Portuguese firms; 
secondly, the ratio relates the long-term debt level that a firm can 
support, from the standpoint of financial equilibrium, with the 
value of its equity. In turn, equity value is influenced by other 
sources of financing available to the business, such as, in 
particular, self-financing and capital increases. Finally, capital 
structure theories can explain long-term financing options better 
than short-term ones.  
The selection of total debt ratio also stems from three factors: 
it reveals the total solvency of the company because it 
incorporates all the debts; it constitutes one of the ratios used 
in assessing the credit risk of enterprises by financial 
institutions; and it has been used in previous studies in this 
area (e.g. Whited, 1992; Mills et al., 1995; Gérard and 
Verschueren, 2003). 
The two groups of firms have different characteristics. The 
results of the t-test for equality of means in independent 
samples and the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test for 
the equality of medians of the two samples show that, in 
general, firms in the HFC group show greater liquidity (CF and 
CASH), investment opportunities (SAL), size (SIZE), 
profitability and age, and lower asset growth (ASSINV), 
collateral value (COLL) and indebtedness, than the RFC group 
firms. For the environment, the HFC group firms tend to 
belong to the most dynamic industries (INDDYN). 
3.4 Model Specification 
The analytical method proposed for identifying the 
moderating role of strategic and environmental factors in the 
financial constraints of Portuguese manufacturing firms is 
multiple linear regression for panel data, using a model like 
this: 
,DXY itititit     i = 1, 2, …, N,     t = 1, 2, ..., T  (1) 
where Xit is 1K and can contain observable variables that 
change over t but not i, variables that change over i but not t 
and variables that change over i and t, D represents the impact 
of time, αi measures unobserved effect (and varies between 
cases, but is constant in time), and μit is called idiosyncratic 
error because it varies over i and t. 
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 The choice between carrying out the estimation by the 
methods of ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects or 
random effects must be made according to the following 
(Greene, 2003). If αi contains only a constant term (that is, 
there is an absence of significant individual and time effects), 
the OLS estimator, applied to all the data, provides consistent 
and efficient estimates for all parameters. If there are
 individual or temporal significant effects, it is advisable to use 
the methods of fixed effects or random effects. 
In the present study, non-observable effects from 
firms/groups are assigned to the industry where each 
company performs its main activity (according to the NACE 
two-digit code). The proposed model is as follows: 
 
itiiitititiitiit
iitiittttt
ttiitititititititit
XXXXDXDX
XXDDDDDDD
DDDXXXXXXXY






91238122101219120
9198181017916815714613512411
310291877665544332211
          
          
  
 
where, 
 Y – Dependent variable; 
 i – Industry (NACE code); 
 t – Time (years 1999 to 2005); 
 βj – Parameters to be estimated; 
 X – Quantitative independent variables; 
 D – Qualitative independent variables; 
 XD and XX – Interactive variables; 
 αi – Unobserved effect; 
 µit – Idiosyncratic error. 
 
3.5 Model Estimation 
Validation of the estimation method is performed through 
several statistical tests: Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg; Wald 
Modified; Lagrange Multiplier (LM) of Breusch and Pagan; 
Hausman robust; likelihood-ratio; and Reset of Ramsey. 
The heteroscedasticity of the model, identified by the Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg and Wald Modified tests, is corrected 
with the Huber/White/Sandwich variance estimator instead 
of a traditional estimator. 
A test for the random effects of firm groups (industries) is carried 
out with the LM test. The test results suggest that industry effects 
are not equal to zero, and therefore that the random effects 
models are better suited than the pooled OLS regression. 
The choice of a fixed effects panel model instead of a random 
effects one is based on the behavior of the unobserved 
heterogeneity and on the results of the Hausman robust test. It 
was considered that the effects of unobserved heterogeneity of 
the firms/industries are correlated with the explanatory variables 
(e.g. flow and stock of liquidity) due, for example, to differences 
related to the characteristics of the environment in which 
companies develop their activities, or to capital depreciation 
rates. The Hausman robust test also suggests the use of a fixed 
effects model, rather than a random effects model, given that the 
null hypothesis of no correlation between the individual effects of 
industries and regressors is rejected. 
The likelihood-ratio checks a one-way and two-way fixed 
effect model. It consists in testing an industry and time effects 
model versus an industry effect model. The test has a high 
significance level and we therefore conclude that the model 
should consider the two effects. 
Note that the model’s interaction terms CF×INNO, CF×DIVER, 
CF×INDGROW and CF×INDDYN are calculated with the variables 
CF, INDGROW and INDDYN centered, to remove the impact of 
multicollinearity and to allow the interpretation of coefficients. 
Lastly, a Ramsey test is carried out to check the robustness of 
the three models for problems such as misspecification. Test 
results show that all models are specified correctly and that 
there is no omission of variables. 
4. Results 
The hypotheses formulated in Section 3.1 are tested through a 
robust fixed effects regression, for industry and time, with 
interaction terms. 
 
Hypothesis 1, that innovation strategy reinforces the effect of 
internal liquidity on assets investment, is not rejected in the 
total sample and in the HFC group 0.05)α(   (table 2), 
showing that companies that follow an innovation strategy use 
internal funds for finance to a greater degree than companies 
that do not. In the total sample and in the HFC group, 
innovation strategy increases the dependence of investment 
relative to cash flows by 0.2254 and 0.3004, respectively. 
The second hypothesis, that diversification strategy reinforces 
the effect of internal liquidity on assets investment, is not 
rejected in the total sample 0.01)α(  , and in the group of 
companies where financial constraints are reduced (HFC) 
0.05)α(  , but is rejected in the group of companies in which 
the financial restrictions are very pronounced (RFC); in this 
last group there is an inverse relationship 0.01)α(  . The 
results obtained in the total sample allow us to state that the 
investment of companies that follow unrelated diversification 
is generally more subject to the availability of funds than is the 
investment of firms that opt for another generic strategy type.  
The third hypothesis, that industry growth reduces the 
strength of the relationship between internal liquidity and 
assets investment, is not rejected in the group of companies 
with higher financial constraints (RFC) 0.05)α(  , which 
demonstrates that industry growth reduces dependence on 
investment from internally generated funds in this group of 
firms. In the total sample and in the HFC group, no statistically 
significant relationship was observed. 
Hypothesis 4, that industry dynamism reinforces the strength 
of the relationship between internal liquidity and assets 
investment, is rejected in all groups. Despite the industry 
dynamism variable having a negative statistically significant 
sign, it was not possible to establish the moderating effect of 
industry dynamism in the liquidity/investment relationship. 
Note also that in the total sample investment increases with 
liquidity (measured through the proxies CF and CASH), 
investment opportunities (SAL, EBITVAR and INVENT), 
collateral value (COLL), ownership structure (OWNER), 
strategies for innovation and diversification (INNO and 
DIVER) and industry growth (INDGROW). Size (SIZE) and 
industry dynamism (INDDYN) perform the inverse effect on 
investment in the Portuguese manufacturing industry. 
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 Table 2: Multiple Linear Regression Model of Fixed Effectsa)b) 
Variables 
Total 
Sample 
HFC 
Firms 
RFC 
Firms 
CF 0.2771*** 0.2695*** 0.5906*** 
 (7.60) (6.62)    (6.35)     
CASH 0.0906***   0.1002***  0.3118*** 
 (4.47) (4.40) (3.55)    
SAL 0.0687*** 0.0387*** 0.0724*** 
 (17.15) (6.37)    (9.38)    
EBITVAR 0.0840** 0.1306** -0.1308 
 (1.98) (2.52)    (-1.04) 
INVENT 0.0785*** 0.0980*** 0.0523 
 (4.44) (3.97) (1.35) 
COLL 0.0709*** 0.0568*** 0.0252 
 (5.41)    (2.83)    (0.97) 
SIZE -0.0110*** 0.0010   -0.0112*** 
 (-5.79)    (0.38)    (-2.64) 
OWNER 0.0157***  0.0173** 0.0113 
 (3.08) (2.53)    (1.05) 
INNO 0.0408*** 0.0254*** 0.0229** 
 (6.36)    (2.73)    (2.04) 
CFINNO 0.2254** 0.3004** 0.0799 
 (2.21) (2.14) (0.41) 
DIVER 0.0271**  0.0131   -0.0325* 
 (2.47) (0.83)    (-1.68) 
CFDIVER 0.3050*** 0.5397** -1.1347*** 
 (2.89) (2.59) (-3.65) 
INDGROW 0.0557*** 0.0776* 0.0292 
 (2.60)    (1.90)    (1.03)    
CFINDGROW 0.0781 0.1950 -1.5388** 
 (0.26) (0.49) (-2.07) 
INDDYN -1.6278*** -1.4800** -2.7094*** 
 (-3.68)     (-2.59)    (-2.66) 
CFINDDYN 6.6699 -4.0940 7.8471 
 (1.30) (-0.70) (0.60) 
Observations 11,204 3,800 2,695 
Groups 22 21 21 
F 44.08*** 18.34*** 15.19*** 
Adjusted R2 0.1168 0.1058 0.1637 
a) Results of the fixed effects regression model for industry (estimator 
within) and time (dummies whose coefficients and t-statistics are not 
shown) with the robust variance estimator. 
b) t-statistics presented in parentheses below the estimated 
coefficients: 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level; ** Statistically significant at 5% 
level; * Statistically significant at 10% level. 
4. Discussion 
The moderating effect of innovation strategy on the dependence 
of investment relative to cash flows may be due to the fact that 
these companies invest more (INNO variable has a positive 
statistically significant coefficient) and choose a financing mix that 
favors self-financing, in order to minimize the costs of asymmetric 
information; this would be due to the high unpredictability of 
their results and the consequent difficulty for the market to 
recognize investment opportunities in companies pursuing this 
strategy. Moreover, an innovation strategy is often associated 
with a reduced collateral value because the key strategic resource 
is often the knowledge held by employees. 
The positive relationship between the variable CF×DIVER and 
investment, in both the total sample and the HFC group, can be 
explained by the overinvestment problem described by agency 
theory, to the extent that investment in a different business of a 
company with diversification of activities is more dependent on 
the funds that the company is able to generate than on the 
existence of investment opportunities in their particular business, 
leading to a situation of inefficiency. It may also be due to the fact 
that companies whose activities are concentrated have a higher 
financing capacity due to a superior financial performance, as 
suggested by the literature that has linked performance with 
strategy. For the total sample the overinvestment problem may 
occur, since a t-test of the means of operating profitability and 
sales of the two groups of companies (with business 
diversification and concentration) reveals no statistically 
significant differences, despite the positive effect that the 
diversification strategy has on the investment. 
The negative relationship observed between the variable 
CFDIVER and investment in the RFC group shows that, for 
firms pursuing a strategy of diversification, investment is less 
dependent on the availability of internal funds than it is for 
firms pursuing other strategies. In this group the 
diversification reduces the dependence on investment with 
regard to cash flows by 1.1347, suggesting that this strategy 
leads to a reduction in financial constraints for this group of 
companies. Companies from the RFC group pursuing a 
diversification strategy invest less than firms that do not 
choose this strategy, and they have a higher financing capacity 
– they have higher sales, size, operational profitability and age 
0.01)p(  , and less indebtedness 0.01)p(  . 
The moderating effect of industry growth in the relationship 
between cash flows and investment in the RFC group reflects 
the positive effect of industry growth in borrowing capacity, 
since the environment increases the likelihood of return on 
investment. Adverse selection costs relate inversely to 
investment opportunities, allowing the financing of 
investment projects through the debt market. 
5. Conclusions 
Data analysis shows the moderating effect of strategic and 
environmental factors on the liquidity/investment 
relationship in the Portuguese manufacturing industry. 
At the level of business strategies, innovation and diversification 
accentuate the dependence of internal liquidity for investment in 
the total sample and in the group with small restrictions on 
financing in the market. In the group with high restrictions on 
financing we cannot detect any moderating role for the 
innovation strategy, since the variable CF×INNO shows no 
statistical significance, unlike the diversification strategy variable 
which reduces the effect of internal liquidity for investment. 
At the level of industry environment, the sales growth of the 
industry mitigates the dependence on internal liquidity for 
investment for the group of companies with reduced funding 
capacity. Industry dynamism (sales variability) was not a 
factor moderating the relationship of liquidity to investment in 
any of the analyzed groups. 
Previous results are justified by financial theory with agency 
costs, resulting from moral hazard and free cash flows, and 
adverse selection costs that affect firms unequally, putting 
more restrictions on financing and investment for some. 
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